Reasons for voting No in the upcoming Italian justice referendum explained by the Chief Prosecutor of Pescara
Abstract: Continuing our in-depth analysis of the justice reform by giving space exclusively to technical voices, in order to offer readers a legal—not ideological—perspective ahead of the upcoming referendum, this contribution follows a previous interview in favor of the reform and presents an opposing viewpoint. The aim is to build a comparative discussion grounded in constitutional principles, procedural safeguards, and the credibility of institutions. In the interview, Chief Prosecutor Giuseppe Bellelli answers Massimiliano Mancini’s questions by focusing on two crucial issues: the separation of careers and the risk of undermining the balance between judicial independence and impartiality; and the proposal to select members of the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM) by random draw. This dialogue seeks to bring the debate back to the realm of legal rationality, where democratic choices can be informed and conscious.
Keywords: #ItalianJusticeReferendum #ItalianJusticeReform #Judiciary #JudicialIndependence #JudicialImpartiality #SeparationOfCareers #DueProcess #HighCouncilOfTheJudiciary #SelfGovernance #Factions #DisciplinaryResponsibility #GrandJury #PublicEthics #Constitution #RuleOfLaw #PublicTrust #ConstitutionalDemocracy #MassimilianoMancini #GiuseppeBellelli #EthicaSocietas #EthicaSocietasJournal #ScientificJournal #SocialSciences #ethicasocietasupli
Giuseppe Bellelli is a Public Prosecutor at the Court of Pescara. A magistrate with solid experience in criminal prosecution and judicial administration. LinkedIn Profile
OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
THE JUDICIARY BETWEEN INDEPENDENCE AND REFORM: AN INTERVIEW WITH ANNALISA IMPARATO
THE JUDGE’S IMPARTIALITY AND THE REFORM: INTERVIEW WITH MARCO TAMBURRINO
Our magazine has chosen to address these issues by giving space exclusively to technical voices and to those who operate within the justice system, in order to examine the key aspects of the justice reform through a strictly legal approach. The aim is to avoid reducing a complex matter to a purely ideological confrontation—one that does not help citizens decide how to vote in the upcoming referendum.
After a previous interview that supported positions in favor of the reform, we now publish a contribution that takes the opposite view, with the goal of offering readers a more complete and comparative perspective. Not to fuel polarization, but to focus on what truly matters: the balance between judicial autonomy, constitutional safeguards, the protection of rights, and the credibility of institutions.
In this interview, Chief Prosecutor Giuseppe Bellelli answers Massimiliano Mancini’s questions, exploring how the role of the public prosecution may change through three central issues: the separation of careers, the proposal to select members of the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM) by random draw, and the establishment of a disciplinary “Grand Jury,” highlighting critical points and implications at both the constitutional and systemic level.
1. Separation of careers: independence and impartiality
Massimiliano Mancini: “In what way would the separation of careers—which in practice is already limited today—be ethically and constitutionally wrong, and how would it undermine autonomy and independence, considering that judges and public prosecutors are two different professions and that their roles should be clearly distinct, like that of the defense counsel?”
Giuseppe Bellelli: “The profession of judges and public prosecutors is the same, fortunately: they are all magistrates who serve the purpose of justice, to determine whether a crime has been committed and by whom, and what sanction should be imposed on whoever is found guilty at the end of the trial. All of this takes place in compliance with procedural and criminal law, and within the framework of two constitutional principles that are not even at the disposal of the parties: the right to defense and the mandatory nature of criminal prosecution. The only ethical reference, in answering the question, that I find relevant to the topic is that of a shared ethic: the public prosecutor is not a procedural opponent nor an ‘attorney for the prosecution’; he does not seek guilt, but the procedural truth—inevitably relative and fallible—yet as reasonable and acceptable as possible. Moreover, separation already exists: only 0.3% of approximately 10,000 magistrates change career paths. The new law will not prohibit career changes between judges and prosecutors, nor will it impose separate competitive examinations. On the contrary, the new law provides that: prosecutors may become judges in the Court of Cassation; judges and prosecutors will be part of the same disciplinary court; and prosecutors will continue to pursue disciplinary charges against judges.”
Selecting the CSM by random draw: reducing factions without weakening autonomy
Massimiliano Mancini “Why would removing the political weight of judicial factions through random selection of the CSM be against judicial autonomy, considering that the Constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary from politics and allows limits on magistrates’ membership in political parties?”
Giuseppe Bellelli: “Given that freedom of association is guaranteed to all citizens, random selection removes the representativeness of the judiciary’s self-governing body and therefore reduces its authority. It would be like deciding that municipal councils, regional councils, or even Parliament should be chosen by lottery. The mechanism envisaged by the counter-reform is, moreover, a ‘cosmetic’ draw that ultimately hands the CSM over to the members elected by Parliament: political parties elect the lay members, while judges and prosecutors would be selected by random draw from around 10,000 magistrates. In any case, the risk would not be eliminated that alliances and interest groups might also form among those selected—especially hidden or unidentifiable ones—close to politics or other centers of power.”
The disciplinary “Grand Jury”: autonomy and the perception of impartiality
Massimiliano Mancini: “What risk would there be in establishing the disciplinary Grand Jury, considering that it would still be composed of magistrates?”
Giuseppe Bellelli: “The system outlined by the counter-reform is intended to intimidate magistrates through an unfair and unbalanced disciplinary procedure, entrusted to a new special court in which judges are a clear minority (6 out of 15) and which rules both at first instance and on appeal, with no possibility of appeal to the Court of Cassation.”
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