From the Abu al-Duhur Crisis to the Competition for a New Regional Order after Assad
Abstract: The confrontation between Israel and Türkiye has moved beyond political and diplomatic rhetoric. The crisis surrounding the Syrian airbase of Abu al-Duhur, the reciprocal accusations between Ankara and Jerusalem, Türkiye’s request to INTERPOL for a Red Notice against Benjamin Netanyahu, and Ankara’s growing role in Syria’s reconstruction are shaping a strategic competition in which the Palestinian issue represents only one layer of the dispute. At its core lies the reshaping of the regional order following the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Ankara seeks to consolidate its influence over the new Syrian order, while Israel regards any significant Turkish military build-up in the immediate vicinity of its strategic space as a potential threat. The United States is attempting to establish a de-escalation mechanism among the three actors. At present, the greatest risk does not appear to be a deliberately chosen war between Ankara and Jerusalem, but rather the progressive militarisation of their rivalry and the possibility of an incident capable of turning a regional crisis into a confrontation between powers linked to different alliance systems.
Keywords: #Netanyahu #Erdoğan #Turkey #Israel #Syria #AbuAlDuhur #Geopolitics #MiddleEast #RegionalOrder #InternationalSecurity #INTERPOL #RedNotice #Gaza #PostAssad #DeEscalation #CristinaDiSilvio #EthicaSocietas #EthicaSocietasReview #ScientificJournal #SocialSciences #ethicasocietasupli
From political confrontation to a security issue
To understand the new phase in relations between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Benjamin Netanyahu, it is no longer sufficient to focus on the two leaders’ statements concerning the war in Gaza. The confrontation has entered a different dimension. The decisive development concerns Syria, where Israel struck the Abu al-Duhur airbase in the north-western part of the country, arguing that Damascus was close to allowing Turkish forces to be deployed there.[1] Ankara rejected that interpretation. The Turkish Defence Ministry stated that no Turkish military delegation had been present at the base before or during the attack and reaffirmed its support for strengthening Syria’s military and infrastructure capabilities.[2] Damascus also challenged the Israeli justification. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani stated that there had been no plan to establish a permanent Turkish military base at Abu al-Duhur and that Turkish personnel were involved in cooperation on training and the exchange of expertise.[3] The key issue, therefore, is not simply to establish what was actually planned at the base. The deeper question is why Israel considered it necessary to intervene militarily in response to the prospect of strengthened Turkish-Syrian military cooperation. That is where the crisis becomes strategic.
Syria after Assad
The fall of Bashar al-Assad in 2024 fundamentally altered one of the Middle East’s key strategic balances. For years, Israel viewed Syria primarily through the prism of the Iranian presence, Hezbollah, and the possibility that Syrian territory could become a platform for weapons transfers and operations against Israel. With Assad’s fall, the equation changed. The new Syria has become an arena in which several actors are seeking influence: Türkiye, the United States, Israel, Arab states and, to varying degrees, Iran and Russia. Ankara holds a particularly advantageous position. Türkiye shares roughly 900 kilometres of border with Syria, supported anti-Assad forces during the civil war and has maintained a military presence in the country to counter what it regards as threats to its national security, particularly those linked to Kurdish organisations.[4] Following Assad’s fall, its relationship with the new leadership in Damascus has become one of the main instruments through which Ankara seeks to consolidate its regional influence. For Israel, this represents a new strategic variable. The issue is no longer only Iran. It is also the possibility that Türkiye could contribute to rebuilding a Syrian military apparatus capable, over time, of acquiring greater autonomy.
Abu al-Duhur and the logic of red lines
Israel has argued that a Turkish deployment at Abu al-Duhur would constitute a threat to its security and has said that it had previously warned Damascus.[5] Türkiye, in turn, accused Israel of irresponsible actions and called for an end to the attacks. The dispute contains all the elements of a classic security crisis. For Ankara, rebuilding Syria’s military capabilities is part of stabilising a neighbouring country. For Jerusalem, rebuilding those same capabilities may become dangerous if accompanied by an expanding Turkish military presence. The physical structure of the airbase therefore matters less than the strategic principle involved. Israel is seeking to establish a red line regarding Turkish military involvement in Syria. Türkiye rejects Israel’s right to impose that red line unilaterally. This is a classic dynamic in international crises: each actor defines its own measures as defensive and interprets those of the other as provocative.
Washington seeks to prevent direct confrontation
The fact that the United States has intervened to establish a deconfliction mechanism between Israel, Türkiye and Syria is one of the most significant elements of the crisis. On 20 August, Reuters reported that Washington was working on a de-escalation process, while U.S. envoy for Syria Tom Barrack described the Israeli strike as an unnecessary escalation.[6] The following day, the Associated Press reported that Israel had not informed the United States in advance of the strike and that Barrack had raised the possibility that the operation could have been intended as a deliberate provocation toward Türkiye, while also leaving open the possibility of an internal Israeli communications failure.[7] Even more significant was the report that Türkiye had considered deploying its own aircraft following the entry of an unidentified aircraft into the area.[8] A confrontation did not occur. But the strategic significance lies precisely in the fact that the situation came close enough to require an American mechanism designed to prevent an incident.
A rivalry that did not begin with Syria
It would nevertheless be misleading to interpret the crisis solely as a consequence of recent military developments. The deterioration in relations between Erdoğan and Netanyahu is much deeper. Gaza has transformed Türkiye into one of the most outspoken international critics of Israeli policy. Erdoğan has made the Palestinian issue one of the pillars of his foreign policy and has repeatedly accused Israel of violating international law. Israel, meanwhile, regards Türkiye’s position as increasingly hostile and interprets some of Ankara’s initiatives as part of a strategy aimed at undermining Israel’s international legitimacy. The Palestinian issue is therefore the political arena of the confrontation. Syria is its strategic arena. The judicial dimension is becoming its new international arena.
Türkiye’s request to INTERPOL
On 21 August 2026, Ankara took another step. Turkish Justice Minister Akın Gürlek announced that the ministry had asked the Interior Ministry to initiate the process for an INTERPOL Red Notice against Benjamin Netanyahu and another defendant in connection with Türkiye’s judicial proceedings concerning the Global Sumud Flotilla.[9] The announcement was reported by Reuters, which highlighted a crucial point: INTERPOL must examine the request before deciding whether to issue the notices.[10] This distinction must be maintained with absolute precision. As of 22 August 2026, it is therefore correct to state that: Türkiye has requested the issuance of a Red Notice; it is not correct to state that INTERPOL has already issued a Red Notice against Netanyahu. The distinction is not merely terminological.
A Red Notice does not mean an international arrest warrant
INTERPOL itself defines a Red Notice as a request to law-enforcement authorities in member countries to locate a person and, where permitted under applicable national law, provisionally arrest that person pending extradition, surrender or a similar legal procedure.[11] The organisation explicitly states that a Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant.[12] Any arrest would therefore depend on the law of the country in which the individual was located and on the decisions of the relevant national authorities. There is another important point: not every Red Notice is public. INTERPOL states that the majority are restricted to law-enforcement use and that only some are published on its public website.[13] For that reason, the absence of an individual from the public database cannot, by itself, be treated as absolute proof that no internal procedure exists. In this specific case, however, the available information is clear: the documented event is Türkiye’s request, while INTERPOL’s decision is a separate and subsequent step.
The Turkish proceedings and the International Criminal Court warrant
Türkiye’s request must also be understood within an already complex legal framework. In November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu and then-Defence Minister Yoav Gallant in connection with the situation in Palestine.[14] The ICC identified, among the allegations, the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare and crimes against humanity, including murder, persecution and other inhumane acts.[15] Israel disputes the Court’s jurisdiction and rejects the allegations. The Turkish proceedings are something different. They must not be conflated with the ICC case. Türkiye is acting through its national judicial system and, on the basis of warrants issued by Turkish courts, is seeking international law-enforcement cooperation. What changes is the political significance of these overlapping processes. Netanyahu is now at the centre of multiple judicial initiatives arising from different legal systems, while Ankara is attempting to use international judicial cooperation as an additional instrument of pressure on the Israeli government.
International law enters geopolitical competition
This is one of the most significant aspects of the crisis. Competition between states is no longer conducted solely through diplomacy, sanctions and military instruments. International law and judicial cooperation have become part of strategic competition. Türkiye can use judicial proceedings to generate diplomatic pressure. Israel can respond by challenging the legitimacy of the initiative and accusing Ankara of political instrumentalisation. Both sides seek to shape the international perception of the crisis. This can be described as a form of legal-diplomatic competition, provided that terms such as “international arrest warrant” are not used incorrectly when they do not correspond to the actual legal mechanism involved. In this case, terminological precision is itself part of geopolitical analysis.
Erdoğan and the strategy of strategic autonomy
Turkish foreign policy makes the situation even more complex. Türkiye remains a NATO member, but for years Ankara has pursued a foreign policy characterised by considerable autonomy from other Western allies. Türkiye maintains relations with Washington, engages with Moscow and Tehran, exercises substantial influence in the Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean, and regards Syria as a matter directly linked to its national security. This does not mean that Türkiye has left the Western sphere. It means that Ankara seeks to maximise its room for manoeuvre within an increasingly competitive international system. That autonomy is precisely what makes Erdoğan a difficult actor for Netanyahu to manage. Israel is accustomed to dealing with regional states that can be more clearly placed within particular geopolitical camps. Türkiye is different. It is simultaneously a NATO member, a regional power, a strategic interlocutor of the United States and an autonomous actor in Middle Eastern affairs.
The Saudi-Pakistani issue: avoiding oversimplification
The regional alliance picture also requires caution. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, committing themselves to treating an attack against either country as an attack against both.[16] In January 2026, reports emerged that Türkiye was considering joining the Saudi-Pakistani security framework.[17] Subsequently, however, sources close to Saudi defence circles ruled out Turkish participation in the bilateral agreement.[18] It is therefore not accurate to present a “trilateral Türkiye-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact” as an established fact. The more significant geopolitical point is different: Ankara is closely watching the emergence of new regional security architectures, while Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have already consolidated their own defence relationship. That distinction matters.
Israel fears a new regional architecture
Israel’s strategic concern therefore extends beyond the question of Turkish military involvement in Syria. It concerns the possible emergence of a Middle East in which regional states develop greater autonomous capacity for military and diplomatic coordination. For decades, Israel has based its security on a combination of military superiority, its alliance with the United States and the ability to preventively neutralise emerging threats along its borders. The new Syria is testing that model. Türkiye is supporting Syrian reconstruction. The United States is attempting to contain escalation. Arab states are pursuing greater autonomy. Iran, although weakened compared with the past, remains indispensable to any understanding of the regional balance. Israel therefore faces a more fluid and less predictable strategic environment.
Netanyahu and the domestic dimension
There is also an Israeli domestic dimension. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for 27 October 2026, and security remains one of the central issues in Israeli political competition.[19] The Turkish question can therefore acquire a domestic political function. For Netanyahu, demonstrating firmness toward Erdoğan fits into the traditional political narrative that Israeli security requires the ability to act preventively against potential threats. But this strategy carries a risk. When an international crisis becomes part of an electoral contest, the space for diplomatic moderation narrows. Any concession can be portrayed as weakness. Any retreat can carry a political cost. And the same dynamic applies to Erdoğan, who has built a significant part of his leadership around the defence of the Palestinian cause and the assertion of Türkiye’s role in the Muslim world.
The risk of miscalculation
The central question is not whether Israel and Türkiye actually want a war. At present, there is insufficient evidence to argue that either government is deliberately seeking a direct conflict. Indeed, the costs would be enormous. Türkiye would face a confrontation with a technologically advanced military power and a strategic U.S. ally. Israel would face a crisis with one of the region’s principal military powers and a NATO member. The more immediate risk is therefore miscalculation. A military presence interpreted as offensive. An intercepted aircraft. A preventive strike. An air-defence system responding to a perceived intrusion. A communication that fails to arrive in time. This is precisely the kind of dynamic Washington is attempting to prevent through a de-escalation mechanism.[20] Deterrence works when red lines are understood. It becomes unstable when each actor interprets the other’s moves as preparations for an offensive.
The real contest is being fought in Syria.
The Netanyahu-Erdoğan rivalry therefore cannot be reduced to the personalities of the two leaders. The personal dimension is undoubtedly important. Mutual accusations, political rhetoric and the conflict over the Palestinian issue have made a return to the strategic relationship that characterised part of the history of Israeli-Turkish relations increasingly difficult. But beneath the surface lies a much larger question.
Who will help shape post-Assad Syria?
Israel wants to prevent Syrian territory from becoming a source of new threats. Türkiye wants to ensure that Syria does not remain a weak and fragmented state and intends to play a decisive role in its reconstruction. Damascus seeks to restore sovereignty and institutional capacity. Washington wants to prevent competition among its regional partners from escalating into direct confrontation. These objectives can overlap, but on crucial points they inevitably collide.
From personal confrontation to competition over the regional order
This is why the conflict is no longer merely verbal. Türkiye’s request to INTERPOL represents the judicial dimension. The Abu al-Duhur crisis represents the military dimension. Competition over Syria represents the strategic dimension. The Gaza war provides the principal political and moral battlefield. And domestic politics in both Israel and Türkiye can amplify all of these dynamics. The Middle East is entering a phase in which the old security architectures have not entirely disappeared, while the new ones have yet to acquire a stable form. In this vacuum, regional powers are seeking space. Türkiye under Erdoğan is one of them. Israel under Netanyahu is another. Syria is the territory where their strategies are now meeting most dangerously. The decisive question, therefore, is not whether Erdoğan and Netanyahu will continue to confront one another. They will. The real question is whether the competition will remain within the boundaries of deterrence, diplomacy and legal instruments, or whether a military incident will cause the system of containment to collapse. Because a war between Türkiye and Israel would not simply be a war between two countries. It could involve an already strained NATO, the United States, the new Syrian leadership, the Gulf monarchies and a regional system in which crises increasingly become interconnected. That is the transformation that makes the Netanyahu-Erdoğan rivalry a matter extending far beyond the two leaders themselves. The contest is no longer merely between Ankara and Jerusalem. It is a contest over the Middle Eastern order that will emerge from the wars that have reshaped the region.
NOTES
[1] Reuters, Israel and Turkey step up warnings over Syria after airbase bombing, 20 August 2026. The report states that Israel struck Abu al-Duhur and said Turkish forces were close to being deployed at the base. (reuters.com)
[2] Ibid. The Turkish Defence Ministry denied the presence of a Turkish delegation at the base at the time of the attack and confirmed its support for rebuilding Syrian military capabilities. (reuters.com)
[3] Axios, Syrian foreign minister to Axios: Israeli bombing of airbase was unjustified, 19 August 2026. (axios.com)
[4] Reuters, Israel and Turkey step up warnings over Syria after airbase bombing, op. cit. (reuters.com)
[5] The Times of Israel, Israel confirms striking Syrian air base, saying Turkey was planning to deploy forces, 18 August 2026; Reuters, op. cit. (timesofisrael.com)
[6] Reuters, Israel and Turkey step up warnings over Syria after airbase bombing, 20 August 2026. (reuters.com)
[7] Associated Press, A US envoy says Israel did not give a warning to the US ahead of a recent Syria air strike, 22 August 2026. (apnews.com)
[8] Ibid. (apnews.com)
[9] Reuters, Turkey to seek Interpol notice for Netanyahu in Gaza flotilla case, 21 August 2026. (reuters.com)
[10] Ibid. Reuters specifies that INTERPOL reviews member states’ requests before deciding whether to issue Red Notices. (reuters.com)
[11] INTERPOL, View Red Notices. (interpol.int)
[12] Ibid. INTERPOL expressly states that a Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant. (interpol.int)
[13] Ibid. INTERPOL states that the majority of Red Notices are restricted to law-enforcement use and that only some are published on its public website. (interpol.int)
[14] International Criminal Court, Situation in the State of Palestine: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I rejects the State of Israel’s challenges to jurisdiction and issues warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, 21 November 2024. (icc-cpi.int)
[15] International Criminal Court, Benjamin Netanyahu – Situation in the State of Palestine. (icc-cpi.int)
[16] Reuters, Pakistan-Saudi-Turkey defence deal in pipeline, 15 January 2026; Middle East Institute, Pakistan’s Strategic Defense Pact with Saudi Arabia, 8 October 2025. (reuters.com)
[17] The Jerusalem Post, Turkey in talks to join Saudi-Pakistan defense pact, 18 January 2026. (jpost.com)
[18] The New Arab, Turkey will not join Saudi-Pakistan mutual defence pact, 31 January 2026. (newarab.com)
[19] Reuters, Israel and Turkey step up warnings over Syria after airbase bombing, 20 August 2026. The report identifies 27 October as the date of Israel’s parliamentary elections. (reuters.com)
[20] Reuters, op. cit.; Associated Press, op. cit. (reuters.com)
REFERENCES
- Associated Press, A US envoy says Israel did not give a warning to the US ahead of a recent Syria air strike, 22 August 2026. (com)
- Associated Press, Israel strikes an air base in northwest Syria to prevent Turkish troops from deploying, 18 August 2026.
- Axios, Syrian foreign minister to Axios: Israeli bombing of airbase was unjustified, 19 August 2026. (com)
- International Criminal Court, Situation in the State of Palestine, 21 November 2024. (icc-cpi.int)
- INTERPOL, View Red Notices, consulted 22 August 2026. (int)
- Middle East Institute, Pakistan’s Strategic Defense Pact with Saudi Arabia, 8 October 2025. (edu)
- Reuters, Israel and Turkey step up warnings over Syria after airbase bombing, 20 August 2026. (com)
- Reuters, Turkey to seek Interpol notice for Netanyahu in Gaza flotilla case, 21 August 2026. (com)
- Reuters, Pakistan-Saudi-Turkey defence deal in pipeline, 15 January 2026. (com)
- The New Arab, Turkey will not join Saudi-Pakistan mutual defence pact, 31 January 2026. (com)
- The Times of Israel, Israel confirms striking Syrian air base, saying Turkey was planning to deploy forces, 18 August 2026. (com)
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