Between international law, national constitutions, European law, and the ethical-legal responsibility of collective security
Abstract: This contribution analyzes NATO as a paradigmatic space of multilevel governance, in which international obligations, state constitutional prerogatives, European law, and political-institutional choices are dynamically intertwined. Starting from the principle of collective defense enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the article shows how participation in Alliance operations cannot be interpreted in merely military terms, but must instead be understood within a complex system of multilevel compliance, grounded in procedures of internal legitimation, normative coordination, and public accountability. The analysis focuses in particular on the Italian legal system, on the relationship between NATO law and European Union law, and on the United States model of the distribution of powers in matters of war and security. What emerges is that multilevel compliance does not constitute a bureaucratic constraint, but an essential structure of balance among security, sovereignty, fundamental rights, and the ethics of responsibility, thus confirming the role of law as an instrument of mediation and legitimation in contemporary international governance.
Keywords: #NATO #MultilevelCompliance #InternationalGovernance #CollectiveDefense #InternationalLaw #ItalianConstitution #CSDP #InternationalSecurity #FundamentalRights #PublicEthics #CristinaDiSilvio #EthicaSocietas #EthicaSocietasJournal #ScientificJournal #SocialSciences #ethicasocietasupli
Introduction: NATO as a Multilevel Laboratory
Founded in 1949 with the Washington Treaty, NATO is not merely a military alliance, but also a legal laboratory in which international constraints, state decisions, and constitutional prerogatives are intertwined. The principle of collective defense, enshrined in Article 5, demonstrates this complexity: an attack against one member state is considered an attack against all, while still leaving discretion as to the measures to be adopted. Such a conditional obligation requires internal political assessments and multilevel coordination, showing that law and politics cannot be separated in international operations[1].
The Italian Legal Order Between Constitution and International Law
In Italy, multilevel compliance is grounded in the Constitution, which regulates participation in international missions. Article 11 establishes the repudiation of war as an instrument of aggression, while allowing multilateral interventions in compliance with the reservation of law and parliamentary oversight. Articles 52 and 87 define the role and command of the Armed Forces, consolidating the domestic legitimacy of NATO operations. Ordinary legislation, from Law No. 80/2001 to Legislative Decree No. 65/2018 and the European NIS2 Directive, has further defined procedures and responsibilities. Constitutional case law and decisions of the Court of Cassation confirm that multilevel compliance is not merely a technical requirement: it guarantees state accountability and the protection of fundamental rights[2][3].
The European Perspective: Consistency Between NATO Law and EU Law
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) integrates NATO decisions with European law, requiring member states to harmonize multilateral obligations, constitutional principles, and the protection of human rights. Missions such as ISAF in Afghanistan and Unified Protector in Libya required the application of a complex multilevel normative framework capable of balancing operational effectiveness with respect for fundamental principles. The Court of Justice of the European Union, in cases C-658/11 and C-658/13, emphasized the need for consistency between international, European, and national law, thereby strengthening the multilevel legitimacy of such operations[4].
The United States and the Model of Multilevel Control
In the United States, the Constitution divides the power to declare war between Congress and the President, generating a system of multilevel control similar to the European one. Legislative instruments such as the War Powers Resolution (1973) and the AUMF (2001) define limits on the use of the Armed Forces, ensuring that international action complies with constitutional constraints and multilateral obligations[5]. Here too, multilevel compliance is not a mere formality, but a tool for reconciling law, politics, and ethics in the management of international security.
Ethical-Legal Dimension and Collective Responsibility
Multilevel compliance is not only a technical or legal constraint, but also an ethical choice. The legitimacy of NATO operations requires respect for constitutional principles, proportionality of interventions, protection of civilians, and political transparency. NATO thus represents a normative and moral laboratory, showing how law and ethics can be integrated within global governance. As Norberto Bobbio observed, the resilience of international institutions depends on their ability to reinterpret norms without compromising their fundamental principles[6].
Conclusions
NATO shows how international obligations, constitutional norms, and European directives can be intertwined within a coherent system of multilevel governance. Multilevel compliance is not a bureaucratic constraint, but an ethical-legal choice that reconciles security, sovereignty, and the protection of fundamental rights. Its effectiveness lies not only in military deterrence, but in the capacity of law to coordinate obligations, mediate discretion, and ensure collective responsibility, thereby confirming the central role of ethics and law in contemporary international governance.
NOTES
[1] Washington Treaty, 1949, Art. 5.
[2] Italian Constitutional Court, Judgments No. 118/1973 and No. 183/2004.
[3] Criminal Court of Cassation, Judgment No. 1921/2008.
[4] Court of Justice of the European Union, Cases C-658/11 and C-658/13.
[5] United States Constitution, Articles I and II; War Powers Resolution (1973); AUMF (2001).
[6] N. Bobbio, Law and State in an International Perspective, Turin, 1998.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bobbio, N. (1998). Law and State in an International Perspective. Turin: Giappichelli.
Italian Constitutional Court. (1973, 2004). Judgments No. 118 and No. 183.
Criminal Court of Cassation. (2008). Judgment No. 1921.
Washington Treaty (1949).
Court of Justice of the European Union. (2011, 2013). Cases C-658/11 and C-658/13.
United States Constitution, Articles I and II; War Powers Resolution (1973); AUMF (2001).
Italian legislation: Law No. 80/2001, Legislative Decree No. 65/2018; European NIS2 Directive.
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