Transnational infrastructure, hybrid economies and criminality, and geopolitical ambivalence between Tunisia, Libya, and sub-Saharan Africa
Abstract: The project to develop an infrastructure corridor linking Tunisia, Libya, and the Sahel region represents an emblematic case of geographical ambivalence, in which space becomes simultaneously a vector of economic integration and a multiplier of insecurity. This contribution examines the Sahara–Sahel corridor as a critical infrastructure embedded in a context marked by hybrid economies, state fragility, and illicit transnational mobilities. Through an interdisciplinary approach combining political economy, security studies, and international relations, the article shows that infrastructures do not merely transform space, but rather reconfigure its hierarchies of access, control, and risk. It argues that, in the absence of effective multilevel governance and robust mechanisms of regional cooperation, the corridor risks strengthening already existing criminal networks and insurgent dynamics, rather than displacing them. The case thus demonstrates that infrastructure development in the Sahara–Sahel cannot be interpreted in linear terms, but must instead be understood as an intrinsically ambivalent process in which development and destabilization coexist and mutually reinforce one another.
Keywords: #SaharaSahel #TransSaharanCorridor #Kuntra #InformalTrade #CrossBorderCriminality #SahelTerrorism #RasJedir #AfricanInfrastructure #DevelopmentVsInstability #GeographiesOfAmbivalence #ElhemBeddouda #ethicasocietas #ethicasocietasjournal #scientificjournal #humanities #socialsciences #ethicasocietasupli
Elhem Beddouda, professional educator with a degree in Educational Sciences and Training Processes from the University of Parma, with a thesis entitled “Islam and the Educational Function: Perspectives on Religious Assistance in Prison.” She is currently enrolled in the degree programme “Global Studies for Sustainable Local and International Development and Cooperation” at the same university.
Introduction
In recent years, transnational infrastructures have once again moved to the center of strategies for development and regional integration, particularly on the African continent. In this context, the project of a trans-Saharan corridor promoted by Tunisia in coordination with Libya and oriented toward the Sahel emerges as an initiative of significant economic and geopolitical value. It promises to reduce logistics costs, facilitate trade flows, and strengthen connections between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Recent sources confirm that the corridor would be developed from the Ras Jedir crossing and projected toward countries such as Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and the Central African Republic.[1]
However, this vision must contend with the reality of a space—the Sahara-Sahel—already traversed by consolidated mobility networks, informal economies, and transnational trafficking. The corridor does not introduce connectivity; rather, it intervenes in a pre-existing system, redefining its balances and hierarchies. From this perspective, the Ras Jedir crossing represents a privileged site of observation. Located at the border between Tunisia and Libya, it constitutes a central node in cross-border economic dynamics, marked by the coexistence of formal and informal circuits. Hamza Meddeb’s analyses show how a genuine border economy has historically taken shape along the Tunisian-Libyan frontier, in which informal arrangements, state tolerance, and non-state networks jointly produce the border order.[2][3]
From the perspective of international relations, the corridor is embedded in a context marked by state fragility, the growing relevance of non-state actors, and geopolitical competition over the control of strategic infrastructure. Within this scenario, the project raises crucial questions: to what extent can infrastructure development promote economic integration without reinforcing dynamics of insecurity? And what institutional conditions are necessary to govern such processes?
Geographies of Ambivalence: Between Connection and Fragmentation
The concept of geographies of ambivalence makes it possible to read the corridor not as a linear vector of development, but as a space in which integration and fragmentation, formalization and informality, control and loss of sovereignty structurally coexist. Moving beyond a dichotomous reading of development and insecurity, this perspective highlights how space is the product of simultaneous and contradictory dynamics. This interpretation is consistent with the most robust literature on North Africa and the Sahel, which shows that infrastructures do not eliminate pre-existing networks, but rather overlap with them and reorganize them.
In the Sahara-Sahel, this ambivalence emerges with particular intensity. On the one hand, infrastructures facilitate the circulation of goods and people and contribute to the construction of regional economic spaces. On the other hand, these same connections may be appropriated by criminal networks and armed groups, which exploit increased accessibility to strengthen their activities. Geographies of ambivalence thus appear as spaces in which different orders coexist: the state order, oriented toward regulation and control, and the informal order, grounded in flexible practices, social networks, and continuous adaptation. In this sense, informal networks do not simply represent a deviation from the legal order, but rather an alternative and deeply rooted mode of economic and territorial organization.[4]
An emblematic case of this hybrid economy is represented by Ras Jedir and the so-called Tunisian Kuntra. The term refers to a system of informal cross-border trade based on the daily transit of goods, fuel, household appliances, and consumer products between Tunisia and Libya. In the international literature, this phenomenon is generally described as informal cross-border trade or as part of smuggling economies, that is, parallel economies operating at the margins or outside formal state regulation. The research of Meddeb and Gallien confirms that, in Tunisia’s border regions, such activities constitute a genuine parallel economic infrastructure, supported by family networks, administrative tolerance, and informal regulatory practices.
From this perspective, to speak of geographies of ambivalence means recognizing that infrastructure development does not eliminate insecurity, but redefines it. The very conditions that make economic integration possible—accessibility, mobility, and connectivity—may also facilitate the spread of illegal practices and dynamics of instability. The central issue thus becomes the management of this ambivalence: not its elimination, but its regulation through institutions capable of operating in complex and multi-level contexts.
Theoretical Framework: Infrastructure, Power, and Spatial Ambivalence
Infrastructures have traditionally been interpreted as neutral instruments of economic development. A growing critical literature, by contrast, regards them as political devices that produce and reorganize space. The reflections of Achille Mbembe and James Ferguson show how contemporary African space is characterized by forms of selective connection, in which some areas are integrated into global circuits while others remain marginalized. Likewise, Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems perspective makes it possible to read infrastructures as elements that reinforce global economic hierarchies, linking peripheries to centers through asymmetrical relations.
Within security studies, the theory of securitization developed by Barry Buzan highlights how certain phenomena are constructed as threats, thereby legitimizing extraordinary interventions. In this sense, infrastructures may become simultaneously objects of security and vectors of risk.
The case of Ras Jedir and the Tunisian Kuntra makes this ambivalence empirically visible. In line with Ferguson’s analysis of the selective distribution of connectivity, infrastructures—whether formal or informal—do not produce diffuse integration, but highly unequal spatial configurations. Similarly, Mbembe’s reflections on contemporary African geographies help interpret the Kuntra as a form of fragmented sovereignty, in which state and non-state actors co-produce border space.
The Sahara-Sahel as a Space of Hybrid Economies
The Sahara-Sahel is often represented as an empty or marginal space. In reality, it constitutes a complex system of mobility and exchange in which formal and informal economies overlap. The main dynamics include human trafficking along migratory routes toward the Mediterranean, trade in fuel and subsidized goods, drug and arms trafficking, as well as local economies based on mobility and brokerage. These activities are not isolated, but integrated into social, familial, and tribal networks that cross state borders. In many cases, they represent strategies of survival in contexts of economic marginalization, while at the same time feeding local power structures, border rents, and forms of parallel regulation.[3][4][8][9]
The principal dynamics include:
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human trafficking along migratory routes toward the Mediterranean;
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trade in fuel and subsidized goods;
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drug and arms trafficking;
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local economies based on mobility and brokerage.
These activities are not isolated, but integrated into social and tribal networks that cross state borders. In many cases, they represent strategies of survival in contexts of economic marginalization.
Ras Jedir and the Tunisian Kuntra
An emblematic case of this hybrid economy is represented by the Ras Jedir crossing, a strategic node between Tunisia and Libya and a focal point of the so-called Tunisian Kuntra (“كنترة”). The term denotes the system of informal cross-border trade characterized by the daily transit of goods, fuel, household appliances, and consumer products between the two countries. In international literature, this phenomenon is described as informal cross-border trade or smuggling economies, namely parallel economies operating outside or at the margins of formal state regulation.
International scholarship generally describes this phenomenon as informal cross-border trade or as part of smuggling economies, that is, parallel economies operating at the margins or outside formal state regulation.
Informal estimates and field studies suggest that, in border areas, a significant share of the local economy depends directly or indirectly on these practices. The Kuntra constitutes a genuine parallel economic infrastructure, supported by family networks, tribal alliances, and practices of institutional tolerance. Ethnographic observations conducted in border regions show that movement through Ras Jedir is structured by daily rituals of negotiation, waiting, and mediation, in which the distinction between legality and illegality appears blurred and constantly renegotiated. The border is configured less as a barrier and more as a resource: a productive space in which control over mobility becomes a source of income and power.
Yet this system generates profoundly unequal effects. While some families and transborder networks accumulate significant economic capital, broad segments of the local population remain excluded from these circuits, widening the gap between rich and poor, especially in areas adjacent to the Libyan border. From this perspective, Ras Jedir appears as a microcosm of Sahara-Sahel dynamics: a space in which connection, accumulation, and marginalization are structurally intertwined.
The Trans-Saharan Corridor: Economic Opportunities
From an economic point of view, the Tunisia-Libya-Sahel corridor presents numerous potential advantages. It may reduce transportation costs and travel times, open new African markets for Tunisian firms, foster the development of logistics hubs and economic zones, and strengthen regional integration within the framework of the AfCFTA. In theory, the infrastructure could contribute to the formalization of economic flows, reducing the importance of illegal networks and strengthening the state’s presence. Moreover, the project could consolidate Tunisia’s role as a bridge between Europe and Africa, increasing its geopolitical relevance.[1]
Yet it is precisely here that decisive ambivalence emerges. Infrastructures do not eliminate illegality; they alter its operating conditions. They may improve territorial accessibility, reduce logistical costs even for illicit trafficking, and create new strategic nodes for the control of routes. In the Sahara-Sahel context, where state capacity is limited, this may translate into a strengthening of illegal economies. Existing networks may integrate the new corridor into their activities, exploiting its logistical and infrastructural advantages. The idea that connectivity automatically produces order thus appears theoretically fragile and empirically unconvincing.[4][8][9]
Infrastructure and Risk: The Adaptation of Illegal Economies and the Terrorist Threat
Despite the potential economic benefits, significant risks remain linked to the adaptive capacity of criminal networks. Infrastructures do not eliminate illegality, but reshape its operating conditions:
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they improve territorial accessibility;
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they reduce logistical costs even for illicit trafficking;
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they create new strategic nodes for the control of routes.
In the Sahara-Sahel context, where state capacity is limited, this may translate into a strengthening of illegal economies. Existing networks may incorporate the new corridor into their activities, taking advantage of its logistical benefits.
To this must be added the terrorist risk, which constitutes one of the central elements in the region. The Sahel is now recognized as one of the principal operational hubs for groups affiliated with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, owing to porous borders, institutional weakness, and the presence of consolidated criminal and tribal networks. Lina Raafat’s analyses show how competition between groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State has transformed the Sahel into a central arena in the struggle for jihadist legitimacy.[5]
In parallel, the Council on Foreign Relations continues to frame violent extremism in the Sahel as an active locus of regional conflict.[6] The combination of cross-border criminality and terrorism makes clear that infrastructure development does not automatically produce security. Without adequate mechanisms of multilevel governance, monitoring, regional cooperation, and enforcement capacity, the corridor risks becoming a vector of destabilization as much as one of economic integration. Rem Korteweg’s reflections on the nexus between Sahelian instability and European security reinforce this interpretation.[7]
The Libyan Factor and State Fragmentation
Libya represents a central element in any analysis of the corridor. Since the fall of Muammar Gheddafi’s regime in 2011, the country has been marked by profound political and territorial fragmentation, which has encouraged the proliferation of militias, rival authorities, and criminal networks. In this context:
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borders are highly permeable;
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state institutions are weak or contested;
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illegal economies play a significant role.
The corridor may therefore cross a space in which state control is limited, increasing the risk of infiltration by non-state actors and reducing the predictability of flows. Carnegie’s analyses of the Tunisian-Libyan border emphasize precisely this post-2011 transformation.[2]
The Tunisian-Libyan frontier is thus not simply a line of separation between two legal orders, but a zone of unstable interaction in which security, trade, and informal regulation are continuously intertwined. In this framework, any infrastructure traversing Libya cannot be read solely in economic terms, but must be understood as part of a broader configuration of incomplete sovereignty, fragmented governance, and a plurality of centers of power.
Implications for International Relations
From the standpoint of international relations, the Sahara-Sahel corridor project is embedded in the broader process of African integration promoted by the African Continental Free Trade Area, reflecting the desire to strengthen intra-African economic ties and reduce dependence on external markets. However, such integration does not develop uniformly and risks accentuating regional inequalities, thereby generating new socio-economic tensions.
At the same time, transnational infrastructures are increasingly at the center of competition among global powers—including the European Union, China, Russia, and Turkey—all of which view the Sahara-Sahel as a strategic space for projecting economic and political influence. In this sense, the corridor is not merely a road or a logistics platform: it is a potential node of geopolitical influence, where regional economies, security concerns, and power projection intersect.[1][7]
Conclusion: Governing Ambivalence
The Sahara-Sahel corridor represents a paradigmatic example of a geography of ambivalence, in which development and destabilization are not alternatives, but interconnected dimensions. The infrastructure will not automatically replace pre-existing illegal networks; rather, it will overlap with them, creating new configurations of mobility and power.
Its impact will depend on the ability of the actors involved to manage this ambivalence through:
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the strengthening of state institutions;
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regional security cooperation;
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the economic inclusion of local communities.
In this sense, Ras Jedir functions as a microcosm of the broader process, showing how infrastructure, informality, inequality, and terrorist threat are structurally intertwined. More than a simple infrastructure, the Sahara-Sahel corridor appears as a political device capable of redefining the geographies of power, mobility, and security on the African continent.[2][3][4][9]
NOTES
[1] On the recent relaunch of the Tunisian overland corridor toward the Sahel, beginning at the Ras Jedir crossing and projected toward Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and the Central African Republic, see the most recent journalistic reconstructions.
[2] On the Tunisian-Libyan border as a space of co-production of frontier order between state tolerance, informal networks, and non-state actors, see Meddeb (2020).
[3] On the persistence and economic weight of informal cross-border trade in Tunisia after 2011, see Meddeb (2021).
[4] For an interpretation of North African smuggling economies as activities largely regulated by informal institutions, rather than as mere illegal chaos, see Gallien (2019).
[5] On the schism of jihadism in the Sahel and the competition between groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, see Raafat (2021).
[6] On violent extremism in the Sahel as a framework of persistent and multi-layered conflict, see the Global Conflict Tracker of the Council on Foreign Relations.
[7] On the relationship between Sahelian instability, terrorism, and European strategic vulnerability, see Korteweg (2014).
[8] On the representation of the Sahara-Sahel as a networked, connected, and unequal space, see Walther and Retaille (2019).
[9] On violent organizations and forms of irregular warfare in the Sahel-Sahara, see Walther, Leuprecht, and Skillicorn (2016).
ESSENTIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Gallien, M. (2019). Informal institutions and the regulation of smuggling in North Africa. Perspectives on Politics. Verified international publication.
Korteweg, R. (2014). Treacherous sands: The EU and terrorism in the broader Sahel. European View, 13, 251–258. Verified international publication.
Meddeb, H. (2020). The volatile Tunisia-Libya border: Between Tunisia’s security policy and Libya’s militia factions. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Verified international publication.
Meddeb, H. (2021). The hidden face of informal cross-border trade in Tunisia after 2011. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Verified international publication.
Raafat, L. (2021). The schism of jihadism in the Sahel: How al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are battling for legitimacy in the Sahelian context. Middle East Institute. Verified international publication.
Walther, O., & Retaille, D. (2019). Mapping the Sahelian space. arXiv preprint.
Walther, O., Leuprecht, C., & Skillicorn, D. (2016). Wars without beginning or end: Violent political organizations and irregular warfare in the Sahel-Sahara. arXiv preprint.
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