A complex path through constitutional constraints, LEPs, public finance and administrative capacity: the challenge of a new balance between State and Regions
Abstract: The preliminary agreements between the Government and four Regions mark the concrete start of the path toward differentiated autonomy, carried out in compliance with the constraints established by Law 86/2024 and Constitutional Court ruling No. 192/2024. The process begins with non-LEP areas to avoid immediately impacting civil and social rights, yet it remains tied to the definition of LEPs, standard needs, and equalization mechanisms—elements essential for ensuring territorial equity. Differentiated autonomy also requires strong administrative capacity, digitalization, multilayer governance, and effective monitoring tools. If supported by coherent reforms, it can modernize public administration and improve services; otherwise, it risks widening inequalities and producing an incomplete and unbalanced process.
Keywords: #DifferentiatedAutonomy #InstitutionalReforms #StateRegionRelations #StateRegions #Piedmont #Veneto #Lombardy #Liguria #Constitution #Article116 #LEP #StandardNeeds #FiscalFederalism #TerritorialEquity #Subsidiarity #Law86_2024 #ConstitutionalCourt #Governance #KPI #MultilevelGovernance #ServiceQuality #AdministrativeProcesses #Reforms #PolicyAnalysis #MichelaToussan #EthicaSocietas #EthicaSocietasJournal #ScientificJournal #SocialSciences #ethicasocietasupli
Michela Toussan, Ph.D. in Industrial and Management Engineering and serves as a senior-level official at the Metropolitan City of Rome Capital. Her work focuses on the development of organizational models for public administration, internal process control, and strategic planning, with particular attention to multilevel governance and the management of complex procedures. She developed the A-RIES model for evaluating cultural heritage regeneration projects and has published contributions on administrative innovation, public policies, and territorial management systems. LinkedIn profile.
With the signing of the preliminary agreements between the Government and the Regions of Piedmont, Veneto, Lombardy and Liguria, completed in recent weeks, differentiated autonomy enters its most concrete phase in the past twenty years. These are not yet the final agreements envisaged by Article 116, third paragraph, of the Constitution, but they represent a clear political signal that the negotiation has truly begun and is generating formal acts that bind the parties. Although not the definitive agreements, they mark a political-institutional step that commits the parties to concluding by the end of 2025 the first part of the negotiation, focused on non-LEP matters.[1]
The goal is to initiate a gradual process, avoiding from the outset the most complex matters connected to civil and social rights, for which Law 86/2024 requires the prior definition of the essential levels of services (LEP). The process defines the methods, timelines and limits of autonomy, incorporating the conditions established by the Constitutional Court in ruling No. 192/2024. The Court clarified that any enhanced autonomy must concern specific functions—not entire subject matters—and must be justified through the principle of subsidiarity, the core of the system outlined in Articles 117 and 118 of the Constitution.
This choice reflects a political strategy of “institutional realism,” which moves forward where possible, consolidating a model of cooperation between the State and regional autonomies that also serves to test the functionality of the new architecture designed by the legislator.[2]
The political dimension: autonomies and national unity in a new balance
On the political level, the process unfolds within a system that has long oscillated between autonomist demands and calls for unity. The Constitutional Court, with ruling No. 192/2024, clarified that differentiated autonomy is legitimate provided it concerns specific functions, not entire subject areas; is founded on demonstrable subsidiarity; and respects territorial equity constraints.
In this context, the preliminary agreements represent a political synthesis: the interested Regions obtain a concrete start to the process, while the State maintains strategic control by defining timelines, scope and constraints.
It is an institutional balance that remains delicate: differentiated autonomy is intended to recognize territorial specificities, but it must coexist with obligations of equalization and the protection of fundamental rights to be ensured across the entire country and population.
The decision of the four Regions to proceed together is not accidental. On the one hand, there is a desire to accelerate a process initiated already during the XVII legislature; on the other, the intention to present a united front in negotiations with the Government to avoid procedural discrepancies that could weaken the process.
For the State, the political challenge is equally significant: granting autonomy without undermining the unity and indivisibility of the Republic enshrined in Article 5 of the Constitution. Law 86/2024 introduces numerous counterbalances: parliamentary involvement, opinions from the Unified Conference, mandatory technical reports, and especially the rule that autonomy cannot be activated in LEP-related matters[3] until LEPs are formally established. This point is decisive not only politically, but also institutionally and economically.
The institutional dimension: LEP, equalization and the end of historical expenditure
For many Regions, the real issue surrounding autonomy is not governance but public finance, with the most significant concern being the LEPs. The CLEP Report[4] and the literature on fiscal federalism show how the difficulty in defining standard needs and standard costs has stalled the implementation of Article 119 of the Constitution for years, perpetuating a system based on historical expenditure that entrenches territorial disparities instead of reducing them.
Law 86/2024 attempts to correct course by explicitly referring to LEPs (to be defined by legislative decrees within 24 months—art. 3[5]), as well as standard costs and needs (which must be periodically updated), and the principle of territorial equity and cohesion (recalling Articles 2, 3 and 119 of the Constitution). In this already complex framework, the CLEP Report highlights an enormous amount of data to harmonize, fragmented territorial geography and the need to define measurable standards.
This is why the preliminary agreements begin with non-LEP matters: civil protection, professional regulations, supplementary pension schemes, foreign trade and international relations—temporarily sidestepping the issue. These matters do not directly affect civil and social rights that must be guaranteed uniformly throughout the country.
The real challenge, however, remains unresolved: without LEPs, standard needs and equalization mechanisms, autonomy risks being incomplete and unsustainable. In other words, the engine can be started, but the destination cannot be reached without redesigning the entire framework of territorial financing. Without LEPs, autonomy in crucial sectors—healthcare, education, local transport, welfare—risks remaining frozen.
The managerial dimension: processes, administrative capacity and service quality
If the political dimension sets the objectives and the institutional dimension defines the rules, it is the managerial dimension that determines whether autonomy will truly work.
From a managerial perspective, differentiated autonomy cannot be understood merely as a redistribution of powers between the State and the Regions. It is, rather, a comprehensive redesign of the public administration machinery, implying a profound transformation in how administrations work, cooperate, and measure service quality.
This process requires, first, a clear mapping of processes to identify and reduce inevitable duplications among the State, Regions and local authorities. Without restructuring operational flows, autonomy risks multiplying rather than simplifying procedures and competencies.
It is then necessary to define reliable performance indicators (KPIs[6]) to evaluate not only how many resources are spent or transferred, but—above all—the actual quality of services delivered to citizens. Autonomy makes sense only if it produces better, faster and more locally tailored services.
Another pillar is strategic planning, supported by regulated control cycles (PDCA[7]), periodic audits and a continuous improvement approach. It is not enough to shift competences; administrations must be equipped to exercise, monitor and adjust them over time.
Digitalization and interoperability of information systems are also essential. Without integrated platforms and shared data, autonomy risks further fragmenting public administration, making coordination and transparency more difficult.
This requires adequate technical and managerial skills; new functions need trained personnel, managerial capabilities and advanced analytical tools. Not all Regions start from the same baseline—this is precisely where the greatest challenge lies.
Finally, the system must rely on genuinely functioning multilevel governance. Certain functions—such as civil protection—naturally require ongoing coordination among multiple administrations. Without clear rules, defined responsibilities and cooperation tools, autonomy risks slowing rather than accelerating public-sector responses.
In summary, differentiated autonomy is a testing ground not only institutionally but also managerial: it requires the State and Regions to transform how they work, not merely the scope within which they operate.
Opportunities and risks: a balance still under construction
Among the main opportunities offered by differentiated autonomy is the ability to tailor public policies more closely to territorial needs. Decentralization, when supported by a clear and well-defined distribution of responsibilities, encourages greater accountability among institutional levels, which become directly responsible for service quality.
There is also potential for overall modernization of administrative processes: the transfer of functions can become an opportunity to simplify procedures, digitalize systems and streamline decision-making chains. Autonomy can stimulate innovation in governance models, fostering experimentation, new coordination mechanisms and faster policy implementation.
However, significant risks also emerge. The first concerns potential territorial inequalities: Regions with stronger administrative capacities may progress rapidly, while those with weaker structures risk falling behind. A second risk involves delays in defining LEPs; without these minimum standards, certain matters would inevitably remain blocked, compromising the overall coherence of the reform. A further risk relates to resources: if equalization mechanisms are not structurally redesigned, new asymmetries in public finance may arise. Lastly, ensuring uniform service levels nationwide remains a formidable challenge requiring a strong administrative machinery and constant monitoring.
Differentiated autonomy represents an opportunity to rethink how the State designs its policies and services. It is not a battle between North and South, nor a unilateral push by stronger Regions. It is a challenge of institutional engineering requiring normative coherence, political balance and managerial capacity.
The preliminary agreements mark the beginning of a process that will yield benefits only if the political dimension provides balance, the institutional dimension ensures equity and the managerial dimension builds efficiency. Only if these three dimensions remain integrated can autonomy become an opportunity to modernize the country, reduce territorial gaps and improve citizens’ quality of life.
Notes
[1] “Non-LEP” refers to matters not subject to the Essential Levels of Services (LEP), i.e., the minimum standards of services that must be ensured uniformly nationwide to guarantee civil and social rights.
[2] “Institutional realism” here refers to a pragmatic approach that considers both the limits and opportunities of the current legal framework, favoring concrete and gradual solutions rather than radical reforms unlikely to be feasible in the current political and legal scenario.
[3] Essential Levels of Services (LEP) are the minimum service levels required nationwide to ensure civil and social rights, as established by Article 117(2)(m) of the Constitution.
[4] Technical-scientific committee with preparatory functions for identifying LEPs (CLEP), established by Prime Minister’s Decree of 23 March 2023.
[5] The 2023 Budget Law (Law 29 December 2022, No. 197) established the procedure for determining LEPs and the related standard costs and needs.
[6] KPI (Key Performance Indicators) are measurable metrics demonstrating progress toward strategic objectives.
[7] PDCA (Plan–Do–Check–Act) is a four-step iterative method for continuous improvement of processes.
Further Readings
Italian Constitution, Italian Republic. (1948). Constitution of the Italian Republic. Relevant articles: Arts. 2, 3, 5, 114–119.
Differentiated Autonomy – Framework Law, Italian Republic. (2024). Law 26 June 2024, No. 86. Provisions for the implementation of differentiated autonomy for ordinary-statute Regions pursuant to Article 116, third paragraph, of the Constitution. Official Gazette of the Italian Republic, General Series.
Constitutional Court Ruling on Differentiated Autonomy, Constitutional Court. (2024). Ruling No. 192 of 3 December 2024.Concerning the interpretation of Arts. 116 and 117 of the Constitution and the legitimacy of Law No. 86/2024.
Fiscal Federalism – Enabling Law and Implementing Decrees, Italian Republic. (2009). Law 5 May 2009, No. 42. Delegation to the Government on fiscal federalism, implementing Article 119 of the Constitution. Italian Republic. (2011). Legislative Decree 6 May 2011, No. 68. Provisions on the revenue autonomy of Regions and local authorities.
Essential Levels of Services (LEP), Technical-Scientific Committee for LEPs (CLEP). (2023). Final Report for the definition of the Essential Levels of Services. Presidency of the Council of Ministers.
Essential Levels of Healthcare (LEA), Presidency of the Council of Ministers. (2017). Prime Ministerial Decree (DPCM) 12 January 2017 – Definition and update of the Essential Levels of Healthcare (LEA). Official Gazette of the Italian Republic.
NRRP – Fiscal Federalism and Enabling Reforms, Presidency of the Council of Ministers. (2021). National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP). Mission 1 – Enabling reforms; fiscal federalism (Reform 1.14).
LATEST 5 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE SAME AUTHOR
IN THE FOLDS OF TIME: GUINEA-BISSAU AND SUDAN IN THE NIGHT THAT NEVER ENDS
“LIFE DOES NOT BELONG TO US”: MINISTER FLORES HERNÁNDEZ SPEAKS OF DIPLOMACY WITH A SOUL
UKRAINE, THE INVISIBLE FRONT OF A TOTAL WAR
SUSPENDED GENERATIONS: JUVENILE CRIME, PERIPHERIES AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
COGNITIVE WARFARE AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ALGORITHM
LATEST 5 CONTRIBUTIONS
NOVEMBER 25: THE FIGHT AGAINST GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IS STILL OPEN
NOVEMBER 25 WHAT MUST BE CHANGED IMMEDIATELY, INCLUDING FOR THE LOCAL POLICE
11/23/1980 — 45 YEARS AGO IRPINIA FELL AND THE ENTIRE NATION DISCOVERED ITS FRAGILITY
THE COST OF NEGLECT AND INDIFFERENCE
THE FRIA OBLIGATION FOR LOCAL POLICE
Ethica Societas is a free, non-profit review published by a social cooperative non.profit organization
Copyright Ethica Societas, Human&Social Science Review © 2025 by Ethica Societas UPLI onlus.
ISSN 2785-602X. Licensed under CC BY-NC 4.0